Sessions are listed at the end of each abstract 

Poster Sessions 1 - 12 (P1-P12)

Concurrent Sessions 1 - 21 (C1-C21)

Plenary Sessions 1 - 12 ( Pl1-12)

1. Philosophy

[01.01]  The concept of consciousness

1  Theories of perception: narrow, wide and open  Jennifer Matey <jmatey@ic.sunysb.edu> (Philosophy, State University of New York at Stony Brook, Tucson, Arizona)
    I discuss in depth, problems that theories of perception encounter when the term 'mind', and/or concept of a ‘cognitive system’ is applied too narrowly. A theory of perception can be considered complete if it can provide a thorough account of two phenomena, perceptual properties, and perceptual processes. Common accounts of perceptual properties and processes can be divided into two varieties. Both presume the materialist metaphysical paradigm. The two ontological varieties correspond with the location the material properties upon which components of perceptual processes and properties supervene vis a vis the perceiving subject. Theories of perception that account for the relevant phenomena in terms of properties and mechanisms that supervene solely on things internal to the perceiver are referred to as 'narrow' accounts. Perceptual theories that take external states of affairs to be necessary components of the cognitive system in order to account well for relevant perceptual properties and processes are referred to as 'wide' accounts. I argue that commonly held versions of narrow and wide accounts are not sufficient for this purpose. I propose a new account that resolves the shortcomings of both accounts That account presupposes close attention to the history, function and use of the term 'mind' and the concept of a 'cognitive system'.  P1

2  Defining “experience” as prerequisite to explaining “conscious experience”  Anthony Sebastian <Anthony_Sebastian@msn.com> (Medicine, UCSF, San Francisco, CA, San Francisco)
    Lack of a precise functional definition of the word “experience” acts as an obstacle to formulating a fruitful explanation of “conscious experience” at the most general level of narrative explanation. The practice of synonymizing “experience” and “conscious experience” occasions a missed opportunity to understand “conscious” as a *quality* of “experience”, which can have qualities other than “conscious”. After Leslie Dewart, I suggest a physiological definition of “experiencing” applicable to all sentient creatures. In experiencing events of reality, organisms must perform a physiological activity, first by receiving information about the event, then processing that information so as to generate a response (physical, mental) that serves the organism’s biological and/or cultural imperatives, directed ultimately to the production of biological and/or cultural progeny: genes and/or memes. Experience-initiating events may reside/originate in either the world outside the organism (external reality) or the world inside the organism (internal reality). In performing the physiological activity of experiencing events of reality, in the elemental sense as defined above, the organism lacks what generally goes by the term “conscious awareness”, either of the event experienced or of the ongoing activity of its experiencing the event. Elementally then, organisms perform the physiological activity of experiencing objects/events of reality “non-consciously”. I emphasize that organisms *perform* the physiological activity of experiencing, just as they perform other physiological activities, such as regulating arterial blood pressure, walking, etc. As with any performance, performance of physiological activities admit of qualities of performance, for example, efficient or faulty regulation of arterial blood pressure, slow or brisk walking, articulate or stuttering speech. In that context, we can take the view that an organism’s performance of the physiological activity of experiencing may admit of different qualities of performance. Humans can perform the physiological activity of experiencing events of reality “consciously”, a quality of performance that I next show admits of physiological definition. It does not stretch to recognize that performance of the very activity of non-consciously experiencing an event in the external world, say, itself qualifies as an event of reality (i.e., of internal reality). As such it therefore potentially could initiate, within the organism, the performance of the activity of experiencing itself as an event of reality, given the organism’s ability to experience events of reality, as I have defined “experiencing” performed elementally. A cognitively advanced organism might have the ability to receive information about that mental (physiologically-based) activity of its non-conscious experiencing of an event of external reality, leading it to generate an adjustive response. Performance of the physiological activity of an experiencing-complex consisting concurrently of experiencing the activity of a non-conscious experiencing has the quality we may define as “conscious”, as it speaks appositely to our intuitive conception of “conscious” and our intimate acquaintance with conscious experience. This formulation provides a physiological explanation of “conscious experience” at the most general level of narrative explanation. A more proximate explanation requires understanding how we perform the physiological activity of receiving and processing the information about our receiving and processing information about objects/events of reality.  P7

[01.02]  Ontology of consciousness

3  Paralysis and the enactive theory of perception  Kenneth Aizawa <kaizawa@centenary.edu> (Shreveport, LA)
    Where it is commonly thought that perceptual experience is caused, in part, by sensorimotor skills, in *Action in Perception*, Alva Noë proposes the more radical hypothesis that perceptual experience is constituted, in part, by sensorimotor skills. This paper will review cases in which individuals are paralyzed by neuromuscular blockade, such as that caused by succinylcholine. These individuals apparently lose their sensorimotor skills, but still have perceptual experiences. These kinds of cases have recently come to public attention in reports of awareness during surgery. These cases constitute a serious challenge to the enactive theory of perception which

predicts that loss of a constituent of perceptual experience will eliminate perceptual experience.  C9

4  Critique of Searle's interpretation of the ontological statute of Freud's unconscious  Jonas Coehlo <jonas@faac.unesp.br> (Ciencias Humanas (Human Science), Universidade Estadual Paulista, Bauru, São Paulo, Brasil)
    John Searle, in The rediscovery of the mind, criticizes the thesis of the existence of a unconscious mental state. According to Searle, the unconscious only can be accepted as content that can become conscious. Although he admits an aspectual and intrinsic unconscious intentionality, he also defends that its ontology consists totally of neurophysiological phenomena which produce subjective conscious thoughts. In this sense, unconscious beliefs would be dispositional states of the brain to produce conscious behavior or thoughts. Searle considers that the mental life is constituted by conscious states and by neurophysiological processes that in some conditions generate consciousness. In this way, there would not be any deeply unconscious mental state, that is, absolutely not accessible to consciousness. It is in this sense that Searle criticizes Freud stating that for Freud the unconscious mental states have an ontological statute, existing as unconscious intrinsic mental states. Is this interpretation of the ontological statute of Freud’s unconscious correct? We intend to show that it is not. In spite of accepting both, the neurophysiological process and the existence and causal role of conscious and unconscious mental states, Freud’s view can not be interpreted as a dualism of substance that considers mental states existing independently of body processes. The hypothesis we will develop is that the possibility to unveil unconscious thoughts from the conscious thoughts does not mean that the unconscious thought as such is in any other place but rather that its content can be inferred from the traces it imprints on the conscious thoughts. In other words, Freud would accept the thesis that the

mental states as such are always conscious but those mental states from which can infer unconscious thoughts have a characteristic content as we can observe in representations that were submitted to condensation-work.   P7

5  Phenomenal unity, mereology, and the individuation of experience  Brian Fiala <Brian.Fiala@asu.edu> (Tempe, AZ)
    In ordinary speech, we individuate experiences in a wide variety of ways. The following are all legitimate ways of using the word ‘experience’: “the car crash was a traumatic experience”; “crossing Antarctica by dogsled is an experience I’ll never forget”; and “uncle Steve had a near death experience”. Philosophers and scientists likewise devise various ways of individuating experiences: they talk of visual experiences, auditory experiences, color experiences, hallucinatory experiences, and so forth. Michael Tye endorses a monist metaphysics of experience on which these ways of counting experience are, strictly speaking, false (2004). Tye claims that there are no purely visual experiences, purely auditory experiences or purely taste experiences. Instead, normal subjects have only a single multimodal experience that is describable in more or less rich ways. When you bite into a juicy red apple, for example, you don’t have a visual experience of redness, a taste experience of sweetness, and a distinct auditory experience of *crunch!*. Rather, you have one big (red & sweet & *crunch!*) experience, describable in more or less complete ways. To motivate his monism, Tye considers a family of regress arguments that appears to threaten competing pluralist views of phenomenal unity. The regresses aim to show that if pluralism is true, then it is impossible for a subject to achieve total phenomenal unity. But it is plausible to think that it is possible (or even necessary) for a subject to achieve total phenomenal unity. According to Tye, this kind of regress constitutes a serious problem for pluralist theories of experience. He concludes that we should opt for a monist metaphysics of experience instead. I will first argue that we ought to reject monism about experience. Adopting experiential monism runs contrary to ordinary and technical ways of individuating experiences, and more seriously, it is not necessary to block the regresses. A holism about experience will block the regresses just as well, and as a bonus it is consistent with pluralism about experience. I'll also argue that when we look carefully at which logical properties of phenomenal unity are doing the work in blocking the regresses, we see that the unity relation closely mirrors the mereological relation (cf. Bayne & Chalmers’ “subsumption” relation, 2003). If this is right, we might sidestep the regress arguments by adopting any theory on which experiences can enter into something relevently analogous the mereological relation. Atomism could work just as well as holism, so long as the atoms can enter into the right kind of relation. Finally, I'll argue that treating the unity relation like the mereological relation helps to make sense of the Sperry split-brain cases. I conclude that it is worth our while to investigate the connection between phenomenal unity and the mereological relation more deeply.   P1

6  A few words about the type of relations between mind and body   Diana Gasparian <an

aid6@yandex.ru> (Philosophical, Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia)
    If we try to characterize the direction of the modern consciousness research we find some tendency to keep some kind of “privileged vocabulary” as R. Rotry says, that is of scientific vocabulary which still provides criteria of satisfactory solution of the “mind-body problem”. Most clearly it can be seen from the program of demonstration of the productive connection between body and consciousness, i.e. in the understanding of the fact how physical produces nonphysical. But if we assume that mental states are not equal to physical and have their own ontological status, then it would be quite reasonable to expect that the type of relations between mind and body will differ from that used in science. Nowadays philosophy and science itself seem to realize that we can get very deep in our studies and registration of changes in the brain which accompany mental states, but not to get any access to mental states themselves, to what is called “first-person ontology”. The problem is that all the connections between consciousness and objects are explained from the point of view of the world of physical objects (it’s typical for J. Searle). Any search for the foundations of consciousness is equal to the attempts to present connections between consciousness and objects as connections between one object and another. For this connection to be described within the natural science approach it must belong to one research field, and it means that they must have one and the same nature. But, as was mentioned before, consciousness is not such a thing as body. It’s difficult to deny that the connection between body and consciousness is not a material one. In other words this connection can be described as conceptual, but not as physical, chemical or biological. On the other hand, if we believe consciousness is an object then there must be something that is aware of the consciousness which becomes an object in this process. If we accept the pair “consiousness – object of consciousness”, then there must exist a new consciousness that would make consciousness itself the object of consciousness. Here we have an alternative: either to stop at one of the points of the line, but then the whole line will put itself in the field of unconscious and we meet an introspection that is not conscious of itself. Or we agree to the endless regress which leads to nothing. If we resume everything said above we may say that a number of fundamental premises of science stop working as they should when they are applied to consciousness. First of all, consciousness is not an object that can be counted or related to some other object. And second is that we try to get access to consciousness through the frame of logical categories which itself is the fundamental attribute of consciousness. It is not clear at all what can be meta-description in this case.   P1

7  Conceivability, higher-order patterns, and physicalism  Amir Horowitz <amirho@openu.ac.il> (History, Philosophy and Jewish Studies, The Open University of Israel, Ra'anana, Israel)
    According to the zombie argument, zombies - beings who are physically identical to us, phenomenally conscious beings, but who lack phenomenal consciousness altogether - are conceivable and hence possible. The possibility of zombies, in turn, is taken to entail that the instantiations of phenomenal properties are not necessitated, or logically determined, by the instantiations of any physical properties. This paper argues that the assumption that the instantiations of phenomenal properties are necessitated, or logically determined, by instantiations of physical properties, does not imply that one cannot conceive of the former without the latter, as long as phenomenal properties are irreducible to physical properties in the way that multi-realizable higher-order properties are irreducible to lower-order physical properties. The zombie argument, then, fails to refute the physicalist view that phenomenal properties are higher-order physical properties which are irreducible to lower-order physical properties  C1

8  Perceptual consciousness is more than the head?  Yoshifumi Ikejiri <a1yoshi@yahoo.com.tw> (Neuroscience, National Yang-Ming University, Taipei, Taiwan)
    According to Noë’s sensorimotor contingency theory, perceptual consciousness is not only constituted by the neural activity, but also by the active body that is required for exercising sensorimotor knowledge. However, Block holds vehicle internalism and argued against Noë’s radical vehicle externalistic view. For Block, "sensorimotor know-how and perceptual experience are causally related, but that is no reason to think that they are constitutively related" and "the issue of the constitutive supervenience base for experience is the issue of what is—and is not—a metaphysically necessary part of a metaphysically sufficient condition of perceptual experience." To sum up, Block thinks that Noë conflated causation with constitution, and that it is wrong to support a claim about constitutive relation by appealing to a causal relation. However, I think that Block's point is misleading. For Noë, the body's activities, or actual movements, are not factually needed for one to have perceptual experiences. A patient with spinal cord injury could still have normal perception in the case that his sensorimotor knowledge is kept intact and he can exploit it smoothly. To say that the sensorimotor knowledge is bodily skill is in a counterfactual sense rather than a factual sense. Therefore, one needs not to do anything explicitly to cause perceptual consciousness, rather, one only needs to exercise the sensorimotor knowledge counterfactually and this exercising activity is perceptual consciousness. Perceptual consciousness counterfactually depends on body, not causally does, and this counterfactual dependency could be viewed as constitutive. Nonetheless, it should be noted that even Block's attack is ineffective, Noë still have to face challenges to his vehicle externalistic claim. With supporting evidences and arguments presented so far, it still favors vehicle internalism. That is, it is metaphysically possible for one to exploit one's bodily skill just within one's head. Either the counterfactual understanding of how stimulation varies with movement or the factually exercising activity of such understanding is possible to be neural activity alone. Any claim that sole neural activity is not enough should contain more metaphysical constrains to show beyond brain activity there is something necessary for perceptual consciousness to asise.   P1

9  Individuation of personal minds in panexperientialist models  Peter Lloyd <peter.b.lloyd@fencroft.com> (Fencroft Ltd, London, UK)
    The difficulty (some would say impossibility) of reducing consciousness to physics is well known and will not be rehearsed here. This difficulty has led some authors to propose that phenomenal consciousness (or some protophenomenal precursor of it) is in fact a fundamental component of the intrinsic quality of physical substance, as opposed to the extrinsic properties that are known to physics. (Historicallly, see Eddington 1928, Russell 1927. More recently, see Lockwood 1989, Chalmers 1996, Rosenberg 2004, Strawson 2005.) This seems like an elegant solution to the so-called 'Hard Problem' of consciousness. A key problem, though, is that consciousness as we observe it empirically exists only at the level of human minds, not at the micro-level of atomic or subatomic particles. There is therefore a problem for pan-experientialists to give an account of the individuation of personal minds. It will be argued that this cannot be done: any model that makes the conscious mind isomorphic to a spatially extended system (which anything like pan-experientialism must do) is vulnerable to some form of the 'argument by dissection' put forward by Lloyd (1999). As a response to this, it is argued that (a) pan-experientialism can usefully be regarded as a special case of idealism (following Lloyd 2005), and that (b) if we relax certain assumptions of pan-experienialism so as to get a more general idealism, then personal minds can be regarded as primitives and not as needing to be built up from micro-level consciousness. References: Eddington, A (1928), The Nature of the Physical World, NY: Macmillan. Russell, B, (1927), The Analysis of Matter. London: Kegan Paul. Chalmers, D.J. (1996b), The Conscious Mind. Oxford: OUP. Lockwood, M. (1989), Mind, Brain & the Quantum: The Compound ‘I’. Oxford: Blackwell. Rosenberg, G.H (2004), A Place for Consciousness: Probing the Deep Structure of the Natural World. Oxford: OUP. Strawson, G. (2005), Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism (or at least Micropsychism). Plenary paper, Toward a Science of Consciousness, 17-20th August 2005. Lloyd, P.B. (1999), Consciousness and Berkeley’s Metaphysics. London: Ursa. Llloyd, P.B. (2005), Mental Monism Considered as a Solution to the Mind-Body Problem, in: A. Batthyany, D. Constant, & A.Elitzur, 'Mind: Its Place in the World.Non-reductionist Approaches to the Ontology of Consciousness’, Frankfurt: Ontos, in press 2005.   C15

10  Searle's expanded notion of the physical  Leopold Stubenberg <stubenberg.1@nd.edu> (Philosophy, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, IN)
    Searle is among the growing number of philosophers who have argued that we must expand our notion of the physical to solve the mind-body problem. When the mental and the physical clash, the materialist reacts by attenuating the mental until coherence can be restored. Reversing this trend, Searle proposes to leave the mental intact and to enlarge the physical until it can accommodate the mental in its unreduced form. “What I mean” Searle tell us “is that the consciousness precisely as an irreducibly qualitative, subjective, first-personal, airy-fairy, and touchy-feely phenomenon is a process going on in the brain.” Thus the qualia of conscious experience are features of the brain in just as literal a sense as its weight and size and structure. This is what Searle’s idea of the expanded notion of the physical amounts to. While this view is very attractive, it does raise a serious question: How are these special qualities “in” the brain? How does the brain manage to realize or instantiate these remarkable qualities? For unlike the traditional physical qualities the qualia of the brain remain undetectable to the external observer. Thus we need an answer to the question in what sense of “in” these qualities are in the brain. In addressing this question I will follow up a hint that Searle gives us when he says that his view is “quite similar” to the version of the identity theory formulated by Grover Maxwell. The sort of view that Maxwell advocates—closely based on Bertrand Russell’s ideas about this question—is intriguing. But it also manifests a glaring lack of the theoretical virtues that Searle values so highly: simplicity, obviousness, commonsensicality, etc. I conclude that the Maxwell/Russell view is not available to Searle. Hence he still owes us a (simple, obvious, and commonsensical) answer to the question how the qualitative features of consciousness are in the material brain.   C15

11  Dynamic emergence and the epiphenomenality of consciousness  Rex Welshon <rwelshon@uccs.edu> (Philosophy, University of Colorado at Colorado Springs, Colorado Springs, Colorado)
    In this paper, I try to assuage skeptical concerns about emergent consciousness in particular by assuaging skeptical concerns about emergents in general. I begin by entertaining the hypothesis that conscious events dynamically emerge from the physical events of the central nervous system. Neither the physical structures responsible for the emergence of consciousness nor a definition of ‘consciousness’' are provided. Rather, on the assumptions that some conscious events exist and that some of them bear a relation other than type identity to physical events, the hypothesis that conscious events dynamically emerge from physical events is considered. A general ontological model of dynamic emergence, with consciousness as the test case, is provided. This model identifies upward causation, high-level causation, and downward causation as constitutive claims of the species of emergentism defended. Next, Kim's Supervenience Argument for the epiphenomenality of emergent events is analyzed. I argue that it is unsuccessful because it does not fully acknowledge the differences between supervenience and causation. Against the Supervenience Argument, supervenient emergents need be neither always disqualified as causes nor always preempted by low-level causes. For, using the subset strategy of novel causes found in Shoemaker, Yablo, and Wilson, supervenient emergents can have their own causal powers and, in virtue of having their own causal powers, they are not always disqualified as causes. Again, using the subset strategy of novel causes, the Supervenience Argument's charge that emergents over-determine low-level causes is shown to be mistaken. In the conclusion, I suggest that emergence is less controversial than has often been made out and that for that reason offers more to those sympathetic to physicalism and less to those sympathetic to dualism than has frequently been thought. But I also point out that, just as supervenience may state the mind-body problem without solving it (as Kim has claimed), so too dynamic emergence may state the problem of conscious causation without solving it.   C15

12  The logic of phenomenal transparency: How to be a phenomenologist and a physicalist  Kenneth Williford <kwwilliford@stcloudstate.edu> (Philosophy, St. Cloud State University, St Cloud, Minnesota)
    One traditional view is that we have introspective access to all the essential properties of consciousness. This view has sometimes been used to motivate dualism. Critics of the view, concerned to defeat dualism, have sometimes taken their critique so far that they have made it difficult to see what connection introspective data bear to the theory of consciousness. An unattractive dilemma looms: either (i) pare down the pretensions of phenomenology to such an extent that introspective data play at most a minimal role in the theory of consciousness, and thereby salvage physicalism, or (ii) accept the traditional view of the powers of introspection, and forsake physicalism. I argue that introspective data can and should play a heuristic and regulative role in the construction of a physicalistically acceptable theory of consciousness. Proponents and opponents of the traditional view have typically run together two distinct theses. The first is that if one’s consciousness has a given property, then it will seem to one to have that property upon proper introspection; call this Strong Transparency (ST). The second is the converse claim that if consciousness seems upon proper introspection to have a given property, then it does in fact have it; call this Weak Transparency (WT). I argue that the conjunction of ST and WT is indeed incompatible with physicalism but that there is a defensible version of WT that is compatible with physicalism. Moreover, WT is enough to give a legitimate role to introspection in theorizing about consciousness. Perhaps surprisingly, I argue that ST is to be rejected not merely because it is incompatible with physicalism but on phenomenological grounds. This implies that there are properties of consciousness, perhaps essential ones, that are not accessible to introspection. And this paves the way for an explanation of the “Zombie” intuitions. I argue that the ease with which we can conceive of Zombies, etc., can be explained by the fact that consciousness has properties that are introspectively inaccessible to it. Furthermore, on the basis of this account, claims about the “diaphanousness” or “emptiness” of consciousness can be given a precise articulation which undercuts the uses to which those claims have been put by Representational theorists of consciousness and others. Finally, the framework I propose can arguably be used to solve the so-called “grain problem,” according to which conscious perceptual states cannot be identified with brain states because the former seem to have properties that the latter could not have.   C1

[01.03]  Materialism and dualism

13  Causality in the thinking body  George Kampis <gk@hps.elte.hu> (History and Philosophy of Science, Eotvos University, Budapest, Hungary)
    In this paper I am developing the view that embodiment if understood properly as a biological notion offers a particular view of causality that in turn leads to a rethinking of the body. The work fits into a broader investigation into phenotypes in evolution [1] and into materialism. Here I elaborate remarks made in [2] where I discussed embodiment from the point of view of the self. The concept of embodiment implies a paradox that (despite the opposite rhetoric) it supports a strongly Cartesian view of organisms. A subjective self and its experience lies in the focus of embodied concepts like force, direction or action. I argued that in embodiment there is too much concern with the content of embodied mental states and too little with the coordination of interactions with biological meaning. To put it differently: the flesh is typically understood just as a source of a particular kind of structured experience – and interestingly, the same is true, with some modifications, even in artificial intelligence and robotics. However, situatedness, whole body interaction, sensorimotor coordination, adaptiveness and similar concepts of embodiment make also a more biological view possible. A biological minded strategy is the opposite of the above: first analyse causal interactions between phenotypes and their environment in cognition, then move on towards requirements for mental representations that utilize such interactions. To cut it short, the biological ‘wisdom of the body’ begins with the structure of causality, not of experience. Causal interactions in organisms, when viewed from this descriptive position (rather than through their consequences) involve a certain kind of interesting complexity. Whole body interactions and organismic actions are ‘fat’ (or as we say in [1] they “have ‘depth’”) in the sense that their effects are unbounded – the relevant phenotype traits that enter in an interaction (e.g. when an organism moves its leg) come along with an indefinite number of further, typically ‘hidden’ traits that are also modified as a consequence (such as the stretching of the skin or the change of the color composition of feathers as their angle changes in the motion, and so on – ad infinitum). I discuss how such hidden traits, i.e. traits with no ecological or cognitive-perceptual significance at a moment and in a given interaction can develop their own dynamics of causation that accumulates changes down on a chain and onto levels of ecological or cognitive significance (as when suddenly color, rather than the exact motion of the feathered leg determines evolutionary success). I also discuss how this notion can come to play a role in problems as diverse as ecological cognition and evolutionary niche construction. We will also see how the emerging picture of the body invites an anti-essentialist, relational ontology – with several notorious consequences. [1] Kampis, G. & Gulyás, L. 2004: Sustained Evolution from Changing Interaction, in: Alife IX, MIT Press, Boston, pp. 328-333. [2] Kampis, G.: Embodiment Without a Cartesian Self, in: Toward a Science of Consciousness, 2005, Copenhagen, Denmark, oral presentation.   P7

14  Buddhism implies dualism  Katalin Mund <mundka@freemail.hu> (History and Philosophy of Science, Eotvos University, Budapest, Hungary)
    In their seminal book 'The Embodied Mind. Cognitive Science and Human Experience' Varela, Thompson and Rosch suggested that by using first-person Buddhist methods, we can develop evidence for embodiment, which in turn would help to eliminate dualism between the mind and the body. In my presentation I try to show that Cartesian dualism has deeper roots. Even in Buddhism the method of introspection never results in a realisation of the non-existence of a separate soul. It cannot serve the purpose of eliminating dualism, because its ontology could not permit this insight. And what is more interesting, according to the Sutras and the commentaries of the Pali Canon, early Buddhist scholars were fully aware of this problem. Following this lead, I will talk about two topics: 1. Buddhist mindfulness/awareness (Vipasyana) meditation based on introspection. The purpose of this practice is to become mindful, i.e. to experience what the person's mind is doing as it is doing it, and to establish the presence of the mind in the world. The meditator understands that everything is changing all of the time, and there isn't any stable structure. The deconstruction of the self begins. The meditator attains higher and higher meditational levels, but, equally importantly, the 'seer' (i.e. subjective self) remains there, in the back. Even though theoretically anatman is accepeted as a basis, the subjective self as a centre pops up again and again by the very practise of meditation. 2. The philosophical problems of dualism in Buddhism Dualism in Buddhism has two levels: the problem of mind/body and the problem of subject/object distinction. Dualism appears to be an organic part of the Buddhist world concept, i.e. in the Dharma-theory, wehere they distinguished mental and material dharmas. Personality is analysed in a dynamic way according to the principal of "dependent arising' (pratityasamutpada). Nothing arises or ceases except in dependence on certain conditions. The application of this principle is most often done in terms of a series of twelve 'nidanas', or casual links, each one conditioning the one which follows it in the sequence. The most interesting part of this series, how 'name and form' emerges from consciousness. Name and form (nama-rupa in sanskrit) are sometimes translated as 'mind and body', because name (or nama) means feeling, perception, intention, contact and attention. Form (or rupa) means the four great elements, and the forms or physical bodies dependent on the four great elements. This is tha basis of the subject-object dualism. The etymology of 'vijnana' (consciousness) being derived from 'vi' + 'jnana', is a kind of knowledge (jnana) which separates (vi). It is defined that which 'vijanati': that which 'discern', 'discriminates', or distinguishes'. The working of vijnana, the discrimination constitute the dualism of object and subject, that is the objective world. it is possible that the reason why the Buddhist efforts of unification couldn't work is because the very concept of consciousness (vijnana) as such automatically implies dualism.  P7

15  The case for physicalism from part-time analog zombies  Gualtiero Piccinini <piccininig@umsl.edu> (philosophy, university of missouri - st louis, St louis, mo, usa)
    The possibility of zombies—as traditionally conceived by philosophers—entails property dualism. But traditional philosophical zombies are only a special and limiting case among the many varieties of zombie. There are also zombies whose possibility entails physicalism. Focusing on whether traditional philosophical zombies are possible, at the exclusion of all other zombies, skews the debate against physicalism. I introduce new kinds of zombie, which have not been discussed in the literature, and argue that the possibility of some of them entails physicalism. If that is correct, we reach a stalemate between physicalism and property dualism: while the possibility of some zombies entails property dualism, the possibility of others entails physicalism. Since these two possibilities are inconsistent, one of them is not genuine. Which? To resolve this stalemate, we need more than thought experiments about zombies.   C1

16  Dualism revisited?  John Searle <searle@cogsci.berkeley.edu> (Philosophy, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley, CA)
    For several decades, the prevailing orthodoxy in the study of the mind, especially in the philosophy of mind, was some version of materialism that denied the existence and irreducibility of mental phenomena. Recently, materialism has been in retreat, and dualism has reappeared. Dualism, for long regarded as obviously false, has now become a respectable theory. While rejecting materialism, I think dualism is equally mistaken. In this talk I will show that the arguments for dualism are invalid and that the dualist theory is mistaken.  PL8

17  A future for dualism as an empirical science?  Charles Tart <cttart@ucdavis.edu> (Institute of Transpersonal Psychology, Palo Alto, CA)
    Materialistic monism, so successful in the physical sciences, has become so pervasive that it has become a rather absolute habit of thinking, an unquestioned style of looking at reality, rather than being treated as a testable, but not necessarily complete, hypothesis for guiding research and theory. This critical presentation surveys empirically observable phenomena, both in nature and laboratory, which do not fit well with materialistic monism and suggest that a form of interactive dualism is necessary at this stage of our knowledge to work toward a complete scientific and philosophical understanding of mind. The basic laboratory paradigm is to take our knowledge of the material world as essentially complete and then set up a situation in which no observable effects, according to a monistic material paradigm, can happen. If something nevertheless happens, the comprehensiveness of materialistic monism is questioned and new questions arise about the nature of the phenomena observed. Such phenomena occurring in nature include out-of-body and near-death experiences and, under better observational conditions, extensive laboratory studies of psi phenomena (telepathy, clairvoyance, precognition, psychokinesis and paranormal healing), as well as semi-controlled studies of what would be the ultimate form of interactive dualism, communications from ostensibly deceased individuals suggestive of postmortem survival without a physical body. Some suggestions for further empirical research conclude the presentation.   P1

18  Finding middle ground between Chalmers' functionalism and Searle's anti-functionalism: A neutral monist third way  Kevin Vallier <kvallier@u.arizona.edu> (Philosophy, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ)
    Abstract: Chalmers (1996) presents two arguments that he claims establish a kind of non-reductive functionalism: Fading Qualia and Dancing Qualia. These arguments are meant primarily to combat the possibility of absent and inverted qualia, and to thereby show that what qualia we have is fixed by natural necessity via a certain sort of organizational invariance implemented by brains. Chalmers uses a related version of this argument to respond to Searle (1980) later on in his (1996). I intend to argue that the Fading Qualia and Dancing Qualia do not establish functionalism, but rather merely establish that mental states weakly supervene on functional states of the brain. By weakly supervene, I mean that functional states do not cause mental states, but rather strongly correlate with them. This will leave open a number of potential views. I intend to outline one such view, which I take to be compatible with Chalmers’ (2003) Type-F monism or Russellian neutral monism. I will first show how one can accept both the conclusion of the Fading Qualia and Dancing Qualia arguments that for experience to change functional organization must change, and a Searle-style anti-functionalism. I will attempt to outline a view where the functional organization of the brain is necessary but not sufficient for mentality. My paper will consist of three parts: In the first section, I will discuss the proper upshot of the Fading and Dancing Qualia arguments: namely that is a matter of metaphysical necessity that experience once present will not change or disappear without a change in the functional organization of the brain. In the second section, I will show how this view is compatible with an anti-functionalist position, such as Searle (1980, 1992). In the third section, I will show how if one accepts both Fading and Dancing Qualia arguments and Searlean type anti-functionalist arguments that one is committed to a varying range of strongly anti-physicalist views. Time permitting, I will briefly discuss various different ontological options for someone who accepts both Chalmers’ and Searle’s arguments.  P7

[01.04]  Qualia

20  A defence of the conditional analysis of phenomenal concepts  Jussi Haukioja <jhau@iki.fi> (Department of Philosophy, University of Turku, Turku, Finland)
    The conceivability of zombies – of creatures physically like us, but without consciousness – is often claimed to cause problems for physicalism. Very crudely, the argument against physicalism would run as follows: zombies are conceivable; therefore they are metaphysically possible; therefore physicalism is false. The argument has been challenged on many grounds. One recent strategy, suggested by John Hawthorne, David Braddon-Mitchell, and Robert Stalnaker, is to claim that phenomenal concepts have a conditional structure, of something like the following form: (1)If the actual world contains non-physical phenomenal states, our phenomenal concepts refer to them. (2)If the actual world is merely physical, our phenomenal concepts refer to the physical states which actually play the appropriate functional role. We cannot then know a priori whether the zombie world is possible, because we cannot know a priori which kind of a world the actual world is. But we have an explanation of the “zombie intuition”: the possibility of zombies is conceivable, because our phenomenal concepts do not rule them out a priori. The conceivability of zombies does not, then, entail their possibility, and physicalism is not threatened. Torin Alter has recently presented three objections to the conditional analysis. First, conditional such as (1) and (2) are, he claims, a posteriori, while they would need to be a priori for the response to the zombie argument to work. Second, he claims that the conditional analysis gives the wrong outcome in certain conceivable scenarios, and third, the conditional analysis only delivers the doubly modal claim that it is conceivable that zombies are possible, while the intuition driving the zombie argument is that zombies are directly conceivabile. In this paper I defend the conditional analysis against Alter's objections. The first two objections are seen to fail once we recognise that the conditionals which are supported by counterfactual reasoning are a little bit more complicated than (1) and (2). What we actually get is something like the following: (1') If the actual world contains non-physical phenomenal states and sensations of pain, and there is a non-trivial relationship between these two, our concept of pain refers to these non-physical states. (2') If the actual world is merely physical, and contains sensations of pain, and there is a non-trivial relationship between functional states and sensations of pain, our concept of pain refers to these functional states. These conditionals are, I think, a priori. They also give the right outcome in Alter's imagined scenario, so his first two objections do not succeed against this more elaborate conditional analysis. Finally, I will show that, while the conditional analysis (regardless of the details of the conditionals) entails that full zombie worlds are only indirectly conceivable in the above sense (their possibility is conceivable), it is fully consistent with the conceivability of individual zombies, and that is enough to account for the zombie intuition. Moreover, there is independent reason to think that full zombie worlds are not directly conceivable in the sense Alter seems to think.  C1

21  Qualia re-visited  Morey Kitzman <kitzmanm@mscd.edu> (Psychology, Metropolitan State College of Denver, Littleton, Colorado)
    The following is a thought experiment which attempts to further the understanding of the notion of qualia, the subjective components of perception. Imagine that you are in a room and your only communication with the outside world is in the form of taps that occur on the outside wall of the room. You have never been outside the room and the taps correspond to different events in the external world. In fact, for every event outside the room there is a unique pattern of taps. The taps eventually form Morse code like sequences. Further imagine that you have the ability to move this room about, although you do not know how the room is moved. Your movements in the external world result in positive and negative outcomes. Soon you learn to avoid the negative and to seek the positive. Now one might argue that this is precisely the way our perceptual systems operates or could operate, if you substitute the brain for the room. There would be no need to really know what is outside the room, just make the appropriate responses to insure survival. A thermostat reacts to the temperature of a room without really knowing or experiencing the qualia of hot or cold. There is no reason to actual represent hot or cold within the system in order for it to function properly. A organism could have a device for sensing hot and cold without ever having to actually experience hot or cold. In the future, AI will produce machines that appear dramatically human without having to represent the external world inside them. . This all being true, why did nature go to the incredibly tedious task of making internal representations of some external world when it has dubious survival advantage? Furthermore, how did the inhabitant in the room decipher the code sequences and represent light as light, given that light never entered the room. Would we not require some equivalent of the Rosetta Stone to make the proper decoding? Could we have ever deciphered the Egyptian hieroglyphs without a Rosetta Stone? Where do we find our Rosetta Stone? What does this all mean? The paper will attempt to show the importance of distinguishing energy and information. The experience of light cannot be derived from information about light, light must modulate consciousness directly. Consequently, the fundamental property of consciousness is energy.  P7

22  Quality as existence  Mark Pestana <pestanam@gvsu.edu> (Philosophy, Grand Valley State University, Allendale, Michigan)
    In this paper I explain the sense in which the qualitative character of a subject’s experience (the quale of experience) is representational of the sheer existence of both the objects of those experiences and, especially, of the subject of those experiences. This account hinges upon recapturing the original sense of qualitative accidents as various ways in which substances exist. In the initial section, I revisit this original Aristotelian characterization of qualitative accidents. He explicated this feature of things as a modification of/in the sheer existing of an individual substance. I proffer several examples of this modification in the be-ing of a substance and contrast this type of property with relational and quantitative features of things. This is followed by an account of the representational theory of consciousness and an account of the two ways in which the very existing of something and the quality of that existing can be represented. I first indicate how representations directly represent existing and the quality of existing in virtue of the spatio-temporal properties of the objects represented. However, such representations themselves possess a quality of being which arises from the being of the subject forming those representations. Accordingly, I next indicate how a representation indirectly represents existing in virtue of its own mode of existence. I conclude this section by explaining how “qualia”, the qualitative characteristics of experiences, are these modes of existing of mental acts and states of mind. Be it noted that the existence that is represented directly or indirectly can be the existing of the subject of experience or of the some other thing. Throughout the analysis, I proffer examples of all of these types of qualitative modes. The paper concludes with a presentation of several examples of my analysis of the qualitative character of experience as the quality of existence. First, I describe the function and use of electro-optical mind control devices that operate by exaggerating the qualitative character of specific experiences in order to induce an overall mood change in the subject. This is readily construable as bringing about a change in the quality of the being of the subject of those experiences. Second, I describe states of mind induced by meditative exercises that are variously referred to as states of “pure consciousness”, “empty mindedness” or (perhaps) “satori”. While acknowledging that there are differences between different traditions in such characterizations, I indicate how such states of mind can be conceived as “dwelling within the be” of an objectless state of consciousness that is thereby representational of the existence of the meditating subject. Third, I characterize the “boundary states of consciousness” that figure centrally in existentialist psychology. These are states of extreme consciousness brought on by extra-ordinary engagements in/with/against the world, e.g., radical confrontation with one’s own death, exposure to extremes of danger or gross injustices. The qualitative character of these experiences bespeak the qualitative character of the sheer existence of their subject.   P7

23  Metaphorical heterophenomenology: Vim vs. the anti-matrix  Keith Turausky <bickbyro@gmail.com> (Tucson, AZ)
    To support his “heterophenomenological” view of consciousness, Daniel Dennett has introduced the metaphor of “vim.” Vim describes the intrinsic worth of a currency as imagined by those who use that currency. The metaphor is intended to poke fun at those who posit the existence of qualia—or, to use Dennett’s coinage, those with the “zombic hunch.” I will argue that, contrary to Dennett’s intentions, the vim metaphor argues for panpsychism better than it discredits qualia. I will also present a more fitting metaphor for heterophenomenology: the “Anti-Matrix.” In the “classic” Matrix, the extrinsic is an illusion, but in the Anti-Matrix, the intrinsic is an illusion. Dennett’s views suggest that ours is an Anti-Matrix world, wherein massively deluded “zombic hunchers” perpetuate a false metaphysics. The suggestion raises troubling questions. While the Matrix is installed by outside forces to conceal a horrifying reality, Dennett would presumably credit our Anti-Matrix—our zombic hunch—to natural evolutionary forces. What function, if any, does the illusion of an intrinsic world serve in a wholly extrinsic reality? Does it represent an unfortunate error in the “hardware” or the “software”? Is it no error at all, but rather a necessary illusion? Has an error evolved into a necessity? Dennett argues that the zombic hunch compromises otherwise rational people’s beliefs about reality. It is worth considering whether this is a necessary compromise, even if qualia do not exist.   P7

23a Exploring the role of qualia in the intentionality of thought   Iris Oved <irisoved@rci.rutgers.edu> (Rutgers University)

     It has been argued that Qualia play no role in information processing and thus either Qualia are eliminable in a theory of mind (Dennett, 1990) or Qualia are genuine properties of mental phenomena but are epiphenomenal in the sense that information-processing agents could just as well do without them (Chalmers, 1996). I propose the hypothesis that Qualia play a very central role in information processing in that they are the key to making an agent a genuine information processor. The hypothesis is that mental phenomena are not information carriers unless they have intentionality, or a kind of aboutness, independent of further interpretation (Brentano, 1874), and that Qualia are what make such intentionality possible. A development and partial defense of the hypothesis is presented in this poster.
  (1) The role of perception in the intentionality of thoughts: Linguistic symbols, seem to be meaningful only by virtue of some agent’s interpretation of the symbols. But by virtue of what are mental symbols meaningful? A brief survey of literature in the areas of philosophy (Dretske, 1981; Fodor, 1987; Kripke, 1982) and psychology (Harnad, 1990; Pylyshyn, 2000) supports the view that mental phenomena come to be intentional via their connection to perceptual experiences, which serve to ground their meanings in the world.
  (2) What makes perception special?: One proposal is that perceptual experiences are composed from demonstrative representations, which are meaningful without further interpretation because they point to their contents directly. In contrast, the category representations found in thoughts, such as the concepts RED, CAT, and DOORKNOB, do not point to their contents demonstratively. The view that perceptual representations are at least partially constituted by demonstrative pointers is defended in psychology (Pylyshyn, 2000). A defense of the view that category representations can be caused to be triggered by perceptual demonstrative representations can be found in Pollock and Oved (2005).
  (3) Are there perceptual demonstratives without qualia?: Data that seem to undermine the hypothesis that qualia play the intentionality-making role come from experiments on blindsight (Weiskrantz, 1986) and masked priming experiments (Kinoshita and Lupker, 2003). These experiments suggest that perceptual representations of objects, properties, and relations in the world can influence thought without any (reported) qualitative perceptual experience. These data suggest that if perceptual representations play an intentionality-making role, it is not because they are accompanied by qualia.
  (4) Can unconscious perceptual demonstratives ground the meanings of thoughts?: A closer look at these data reveal that they leave room for qualia to play a role in their processing. All such cases of supposed unconscious perception seem only to be present in subjects who did in fact have conscious qualitative experiences of those very stimuli, which were later presented to them unconsciously during the experiments. Indeed, one experiment (Forster, unpublished) suggests that masked priming effects only occur under conditions of prior conscious exposure, suggesting that grounding may indeed require qualia.
  (5) Call for data: Further research is in call to further address the hypothesis that qualia play a role in cognition insofar as they are the intentionality makers of thoughts.  P7

[01.05]  Machine consciousness

24  Counterfactual computational vehicles of consciousness  Ron Chrisley <ronc@sussex.ac.uk> (COGS, University of Sussex, Falmer, East Sussex, UK)
    In a recent paper (Bishop 2002), Bishop argues against computational explanations of consciousness by confronting them with a dilemma. On a non-causal or weakly causal construal of computation, familiar arguments from Putnam and Searle reveal computation to be too observer-relative to be able to underwrite any law-involving explanation of consciousness. On a (much more plausible) strongly causal notion of computation (Chalmers 1994; Chalmers 1996; Chrisley 1994), computational explanations must advert to non-actual, counterfactual states and state transitions. Working this fact into versions of Fading Qualia and Suddenly Disappearing Qualia arguments, Bishop concludes that strongly causal computationalism cannot be physicalist, in that it maintains that two states may differ only their non-physical (i.e. counterfactual) properties and yet be phenomenally distinct. I rebut this argument by embracing the second horn, and denying that appeal to non-actual or counterfactual properties is at odds with physicalism; indeed, it is the lifeblood of normal, physical, causal explanation. I further cast doubt on the argument by showing that it is too strong; if it is correct, computational states could not explain anything at all, not even computational phenomena, let alone conscious experience. I show how computational states that differ in their counterfactual properties must, contra Bishop's characterization, differ with respect to some of their actual properties. However, I note that inter-dependencies between current experience and computational state may only be explicable by reference to explicit, counterfactual states rather than the occurrent physical states which realize those dispositional properties. This is shown to cohere with at least one understanding (Chrisley 2004) of the sensorimotor contingency theory of perceptual experience (O'Regan and Noe 2000), in which expectation is understood as a disposition to produce a computational state corresponding to the sensation one would have if one were to perform a particular action. I conclude by sketching some implications for the search for correlates of experience. The considerations arising out of Bishop's argument show that if computationalism is true, then the search for correlates will fail if it only considers occurrent non-dispositionally construed physical states at a time to be the possible correlates of the experience being had at that time. References: Bishop, J.M. (2002) "Dancing With Pixies", in Preston, J. & Bishop, J.M., (eds), Views into the Chinese Room, pp. 360-379, Oxford University Press. Chalmers, D.J. (1994) "On Implementing a Computation", Minds and Machines, vol.4, pp.391-402. Chalmers, D. (1996) "Does a Rock Implement Every Finite-State Automaton?", Synthese, vol.108, pp.309-333. Chrisley, R. (1994) "Why Everything Doesn't Realize Every Computation," Minds & Machines 4:4, pp 403-420. Chrisley (2004) "Perceptual Experience as the Mastery of Sensorimotor Representational Contingencies", abstract in The Proceedings of Towards a Science of Consciousness 2004, p 119. O'Regan, K., and Noe, A. (2001) "A Sensorimotor Account of Vision and Visual Consciousness", Behavioral And Brain Sciences 24(5).  C18

25  The mechanical implementation of consciousness  John Lin <johnlin@mysmartpost.com> (Prometheus Press, Cerritos, CA 90703)
    A "conscious room" metaphor is used to represent all the known operations of the human consciousness. The conscious room is run by a mechanical robot called "consciousness," and everything the robot knows represents the content of our conscious awareness. Functions replicated in the conscious room include a communication console by which the robot can communicate with the outside world, a language translator, working memory, explicit memory, an imaginary theater where thinking and imagery manipulation can occur, and various means the conscious can communicate with the unconscious by means of thoughts and feelings. A way for the "conscious" robot to activate the various unconscious operations will also be described. It will be shown that the setup of the conscious room can simulate all features of human consciousness, including subjective experiences. An "English Room" metaphor will be used to refute John Searl's "Chinese Room" metaphor to argue that purely mechanical processes can understand the meaning of language. Novel ways to simulate thoughts and emotions and human reasoning are also presented.  P1

26  Z-Counselors: Consciousness, counseling, empathy and emotions  Joe Marchal, Jack Presbury, Graduate Psychology Program; Eric Cowan, Graduate Psychology Program; Ed McKee, Graduate Psychology Program, James Madison University <marchajh@jmu.edu> (Integrated Science and Technology and Computer Science Departments, James Madison University, Harrisonburg , VA)
    Turing (1950) famously speculated that in about 50 years time the average interrogator playing the imitation game (Turing Test) would not have more than a 70% chance of making the right identification (as to if a machine or human is answering the interrogator’s questions) after five minutes of questioning. While this has not yet come to pass, enough progress has been made in AI technologies that we have a whole new set of Turing-like speculations: e.g., Moravec (1999) “Generation four robots will be so much like us we will begin to ask if they posse a mental life like ours, whether they have emotions, and if they are conscious;” Brain (2003) believes that by 2050 … it is likely that half the jobs in the United States will be held by robots, including jobs as … scientists, teachers, engineers, doctors and counselors, resulting in up to 50% unemployment. We are interested in the role (use) of consciousness in counseling. We mine Turing (1950) for implications for the claim that effective counseling does not require a conscious counselor. This comes to the claims that a Turing Zombie (Z) Counselor can be built to pass a Counselor Credentialing Test and that said Z-Counselor can provide counseling services adequate to the needs of most, if not all, clients. We update Turing’s assumptions about the technologies needed to build a Z-counselor; present anecdotal evidence from the histories of Eliza-like and Kismet-like systems illustrating the human propensity for attributions of human psychological state to non-humans; note that onlinecounseling is an ongoing business and that how upon hearing our story a surprising number of professional counselors are intrigued by, if not completely taken with both the plausibility and practicality of Z-Counselors. We review professionally informed intuitions about the role of consciousness in counseling; narratives of professional behavior that confirm our beliefs that counselors and clients bring consciousness to counseling and that consciousness plays a central role in session outcomes; everything about the claim that consciousness can in any way be absence from counseling feel wrong, verging on the absurd. To paraphrase one presenter, we cannot have counseling without empathy and we cannot have empathy without experiencing the rich panoply of human emotions in situ, that is, in the human mind-body in a cultural context. Theoretical support for this position is found in (Baron-Cohen 1996) our ability to mind read. In the exchange between counselor and client, minding reading is a critical part of the counseling process. This could also explain our propensity to attribute psychological states to non-human subjects noted above. Turing’s 1950 bet was” … that at the end of the (20th) century the use of words and general educated opinion will have altered so much that one will be able to speak of machines thinking without expecting to be contradicted.” Maravec et al are currently making the same bet about consciousness. Z-Counselors as it turns out are not zombies after all; an intentional stance (Dennett 1978) leads to a new meme (Dawkins 1976).   P1

27  The clock speed of consciousness and the moral worth of mind  Jeff Medina <analyticphilosophy@gmail.com> (Birkbeck, University of London; Institute for Ethics & Emerging Technologies; Singularity Institute, Fairfax, VA)
    Given a weak form of the computational theory of mind, physics allows the possibility of the acceleration of the speed of consciousness experience. The primary thrust of this paper is that we have a moral obligation to bring about such acceleration. Section one looks briefly at some scientifically realistic ways to accomplish this, a knowledge of which is helpful in the discussion that follows. One path to accelerated consciousness is the direct creation of new minds, or artificial intelligence, that take advantage of substrates more efficient than the human brain; another is the transference of a pre-existing mind from one substrate to another, a scenario known as uploading. In section two, the moral case for pursuing accelerated conscious experience is made from an aggregative consequentialist approach. An upper bound on the opportunity cost of not pursuing accelerated conscious experience is derived using data from neuroscience and the physics of computation, and is staggering. In section three, potential objections are examined and counterarguments are provided. Section four summarizes the results and provides some initial thoughts on areas indeed of future investigation, such as whether various deontological and virtue ethical approaches accord with this result.  C18

[01.06]  Mental causation and the function of consciousness

28  The significance of phenomenal consciousness: Why blindsight and neglect syndromes cannot undermine the function of phenomenal consciousness  Chien-Hui Chiu, Allen Houng <st.lynn@gmail.com> (Department of Life Sciences, National Yang Ming University, Taipei, Taiwan, Taiwan (Republic of China))
    Blindsight and visual neglect show interesting dissociation between phenomenal consciousness and the ability to discriminate, report and respond to visual stimulus. In this paper, I will first state that the two symptoms seem to strongly suggest phenomenal consciousness as neither necessary nor sufficient for cognitive functions, which imply viewing phenomenal consciousness as a functionless phenomenon. However, I will argue that from an evolutionary and biological point of view, functional phenomenal consciousness could be compatible with the above brain damage symptoms while being an important physical property of the brain. Many theories argue for the functionless of consciousness with neglect and blindsight syndromes as supporting evidences. Blindsight patients are blind in the visual fields of damaged areas; yet visual input is still “processed” and “perceived” without phenomenal consciousness. Cognitive function without phenomenal consciousness thus implies that phenomenal consciousness is not a prerequisite for these actions. On the other hand, neglect syndrome patients cannot acknowledge the existence of their left side of space or objects following lesions at the right posterior parietal lobes, resulting in inability to report or act upon the stimuli within. Psychological and neurological data on how perception of the neglected areas can be restored strongly suggest that neglect patients still retain complete phenomenal consciousness of the neglected part of the world, thus implying phenomenal consciousness’s insufficiency for function. From the two syndromes above, phenomenal consciousness is thus deemed useless in the sense that it is neither necessary nor sufficient for action or perception. But how consciousness could have evolved thus becomes a puzzle. Theories account for this puzzle by regarding consciousness as an evolutionary by-product, an epiphenomenon, or even an illusion. However, I argue that phenomenal consciousness, as a physical property of the brain, plays an important role in the realizing of cognitive functions. The function of wings—flying—seems to be a function that can be realized by different materials such as feathers, leather, metal, etc. Therefore, the materials seem nonessential for the function of flying. Likewise, phenomenal consciousness as a property of the material, brain, seems to be unimportant to its cognitive functions. However, the physical properties of materials coupled with its environment play crucial roles in determining the function of the realizer that makes the exact function only realizable by materials with those physical properties. Only feathered wings could fly “this way” in “this” environment, no other material could realize the exact way of flying. Phenomenal consciousness could have evolved as a crucial property of the brain that is biologically important to the realization of cognitive functions. By considering the role of low level functions in the development and evolution of high level functions in biological systems, blindsight and neglect syndromes could be explained while preserving the importance of phenomenal consciousness.   P1

29  Strange loops, downward causation, distributed consciousness  Douglas Hofstadter <dughof@cs.indiana.edu> (Center for Research on Concepts and Cognition, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN)
    As everyone knows from hearing microphones screeching in auditoriums, feedback loops give rise to a highly stable type of locking-in phenomenon. A related phenomenon arises in other types of feedback loops -- in particular, in video feedback. The patterns that result from such feedback loops exhibit stability and robustness, and therefore take on a seeming reality at their own level. The brain¹s mirroring of the world is far more complex than that of a television camera, since its purpose is to ³make sense² of the world, which means the selective activation of small sets of symbolic structures, or as I call them, ³symbols², which reside on a level far higher than that of neurons. The interplay of symbols in the brain constitutes thought, and thought results in behavior, whose consequences are then perceived anew by the selfsame brain. Such a feedback loop exists in any system that has internal symbols, but when the symbolic repertoire is unlimitedly extensible (through the mechanism of chunking) and when it additionally gives rise not only to permanent records of past episodes but also to the possibility of imagining future and counterfactual scenarios (which is the case for human brains but not for, say, dog brains), then the system¹s representation of itself becomes an extremely stable, robust, locked-in, epiphenomenal pattern (which I dub a ³strange loop²), and the system thus fabricates for itself an ³I², whose reality (to the system itself) seems beyond doubt. The ³I² seems to act on the world purely through high-level phenomena such as desires, hopes, beliefs, and so on -- and this lends it an apparent quality of ³downward causation² (i.e., thoughts and other emergent phenomena ³pushing around² particles, rather than the reverse). To the extent that the ³I² is real, so is downward causation and also conversely: to the extent that downward causation is real, so is the ³I². Each human being, by virtue of being acquainted with (and thus internally mirroring) many other human beings, houses not only one strange loop or ³I², but many such, at extremely different levels of fidelity -- metaphorically speaking, mosaics at wildly different grain sizes. Thus each human brain is the locus of not just one consciousness (or ³soul²) but of many such, having different levels of intensity or presence. Conversely, a given individual, although it inhabits primarily a particular brain, does not inhabit that brain exclusively, and as a consequence each human ³soul² and each human identity is a somewhat distributed entity. The near-alignment of one brain and one soul is thus misleading: it gives rise to the illusion that consciousness is not distributed, and it is that illusion that is the source of much confusion about what we human beings really are.   PL6

30  Phenomenology, knowledge, cognition, and the function of consciousness  Aaron Nitzkin <anitzkin@tulane.edu> (Interdisciplinary, Tulane University, Paradise, CA)
    This essay presents a re-interpretation of the phenomenology of consciousness and a model of ‘what consciousness does and why’ that bridges the “explanatory gap” in terms of information processing. The author argues that the natural function of consciousness is the evolution of a certain kind of knowledge, definable in terms of the relationship between a conscious nervous system and the physical ‘multiverse.’ The author’s examination of the phenomenology of consciousness leads to a re-seeing of the relationship between conscious and ‘non-conscious,’ information, centered around the observation that the ‘non-conscious’ information in a conscious nervous system is implicitly present to consciousness in terms of its role in modulating conscious perception and behavior. The author then argues that the adaptive function of phenomenological consciousness is to organize information in a particular way that condenses the largest possible amount of information relevant to the self in each moment in order to maximize the intelligence of behavior. The intelligence-maximizing function of consciousness is defined and explored in terms of three cognitive capacities—sensitivity, insight, and creativity. The author presents a model of the information process embodied by consciousness that involves three streams of information—sensation, feeling (including instinctive response and emotion), and meaning (both primitive categorization and conceptualization). In this model these three streams of information progress through a loop including three distinct levels of organization—unconscious (inherited), sub-conscious (acquired from experience), and conscious. The central information structure of this process is the sub-conscious autobiographical identity. The author explores how this process enables consciousness to condense information into the conscious format in such a way that it potentially maximizes the intelligence of behavior. The author concludes by proposing that this process can be usefully related to current theories concerning the nature of knowledge relative to the ‘multiverse’ model of physical reality (as described by physicist David Deutsch). The author suggests that the conscious information process he has described is unique in terms of the range of possible universes to which it is relevant in such a way that it demonstrates the potential of consciousness to approach (or simulate?) ‘objective’ or multi-universally relevant knowledge. It is this capacity of consciousness, the author suggests, that makes consciousness potentially infinitely more adaptive than non-conscious cognition.   P1

[01.07]  The 'hard problem' and the explanatory gap

31  The explanatory gap: From a zombie’s point of view  Dave Beisecker <beiseckd@unlv.nevada.edu> (Philosophy, UNLV, Las Vegas, NV)
    Despite their lip service to the possibility of zombie worlds, I would suggest that even those neo-dualists who enlist zombies in their thought experiments to illustrate the gap between the material and the phenomenal fail to take the zombie threat seriously enough. For the weird thing is that the envisioned zombies themselves ought to find neo-dualist arguments against materialistic accounts of phenomenal consciousness every bit as compelling as “regular” folk. However, they would be mistaken to conclude from these considerations that immaterial qualia attend their own experiences. So the issue of whether we should be persuaded by explanatory gap arguments against materialism turns on our ability to rule out the possibility that we are not zombies, creatures that would be mistakenly seduced into believing in immaterial qualia. And this is precisely what I fear we cannot do, at least not without begging the question. So the real problem with zombies is not their ultimate inconceivability, but rather the “live” possibility that they are actual. In this paper, I plan to flesh out this possibility by telling the story from the perspective of Dave Chalmers’ zombie twin. Zombies like him have had to learn how to talk like everyone else, but they have to do it without the benefit of “consciousness,” as qualia-lovers understand it. Specifically, I offer an account of how zombies could come to talk about the qualitative dimension of their experience and accept an explanatory gap between the material and phenomenal without invoking immaterial properties of experience. On this account, by using the phrase “what it’s like” as a pre-theoretical means of talking about the inner states they use to discriminate between external properties in the world, zombies can easily embrace a form of what Chalmers would call “Type-B Materialism.” So what zombies find conceivable (though not actual) is the possibility that they use immaterial inner states to discriminate external properties of their environments. After showing how zombies can make perfect sense of such puzzling features of phenomenal consciousness as its transparency, first-person authority, inter- and intra-personal comparisons of what it’s like to have various experiences, and attributions of knowledge of what it’s like to have those experiences, I show how zombies can also endorse the intuitions that get explanatory gap arguments off the ground: that what its like to have certain experiences could have been vastly different from what they actually are and can come apart from a given experience’s intentional and physiological profiles. If this story about zombie consciousness sounds plausible (or better yet, familiar!), then it would seem that one ought to entertain the possibility, not that zombies aren't possible, but rather that we too live in a zombie world. What is really conceivable, though unlikely, is that we are not zombies – that we have conscious states are as the lovers of immaterial qualia understand them.   C1

32  Psychiatrists demand consciousness: Or the need for the middle road between Chalmers’ hard and easy problems.  Michael Cerullo <cerullom@hotmail.com> (Psychiatry, University of Cincinnati, Cincinnati , OH)
    A curious article appeared recently in the flagship journal of American psychiatry. The article, "Towards a Philosophical Structure for Psychiatry", was written by Kenneth Kendler, one of the leading voices in psychiatry. Kendler advocates a “pluralistic” stance in philosophy of mind; rejecting both Cartesian dualism and epiphenomenalism and demanding bidirectional mind to brain causality. Kendler’s concerns reflect a pragmatic tendency among psychiatrists unimpressed with debates in philosophy that seem to “explain” away any real mental causality. In psychiatry, these are not merely theoretical questions but have immediate application in how to treat patients. Psychiatry requires more than functionalism can provide. While sympathetic to Kendler’s concerns, a major limitation in his essay was a lack of philosophical arguments supporting his position. The goal of this essay is to provide that support. First, there are strong pragmatic arguments in favor of mental causality. While out of fashion with philosophy of mind, pragmatism is what drives science and industry. Much of the recent work in philosophy of mind has developed from questions raised in artificial intelligence. However, scientists within the biological realm are concerned with very different questions. One important illustrative example is the field of cosmetic psychopharmacology, the development of drugs to enhance mood and emotion. The emotional system evolved from rapid appraisal mechanisms of the environment. These systems may no longer provide us with the most useful “truths” about the environment. The goal of cosmetic psychopharmacological research is liberation from current limitations in self and will by gaining more control over when emotional responses occur, and viewing ourselves as automatons is counterproductive in such research. These new endeavors challenge the usefulness of many current paradigms in the philosophy of mind. Within functionalism, it is paradox that creatures would attempt to expand something which does not exist. In fact, much existential and religious philosophy is also a paradox when functionalism is accepted. Current arguments within philosophy of mind also support Kendler’s concerns, illustrated by the recent debate between Pinker and Fodor. Pinker believes that we know exactly how the mind works; no new tools are needed to understand the mind/brain or their interaction. Fodor, one of the founders of cognitive science and functionalism, states that we actually understand very little about how the mind works, and he directly challenges the completeness of the functionalist account of mind based on the problem of abduction. The first step in resolving this dilemma (right after admitting there is a problem), is to acknowledge that another layer is needed in Chalmers’ formulation of the problem of consciousness. This new “middle problem” falls between Chalmers’ easy and hard problem and addresses mental causality with the recognition that functionalism is inadequate (although functionalism may still be the answer to the easy problem). The middle problem does not attempt to address the most fundamental questions about consciousness which are left to the hard problem. This new formulation is the first step in moving into the pragmatic new realm of empowered neuroscience.   P7

33  Conscious realism: A new formulation and solution of the mind-body problem  Donald Hoffman <ddhoff@uci.edu> (Department of Cognitive Science, UC Irvine, Irvine, CA)
    Despite substantial efforts by many researchers, we still have no scientific theory of how brain activity can create, or be, conscious experience. Current theories hint at where we might hope to find a scientific theory of consciousness—perhaps in information theory, information integration theory, complexity theory, neural Darwinism, reentrant neural networks, quantum holism, type or token physicalism, reductive or nonreductive functionalism. These theories fall short of the minimal standards of quantitive precision, novel prediction, and explanatory scope that are normally required of a scientific theory. This is troubling, since we have a large body of correlations between brain activity and consciousness, and between brain impairments and conscious impairments, correlations normally assumed to entail that brain activity creates conscious experience. In this talk I explore a solution to the mind-body problem that starts with the converse assumption: these correlations arise because consciousness creates brain activity, and indeed creates all objects and properties of the physical world. To this end, I develop two theses. The multimodal user interface (MUI) theory of perception states that perceptual experiences do not match or approximate properties of the objective world, but instead provide a simplified, species-specific, user interface to that world. I argue for this thesis on evolutionary grounds, and on the basis of results in computational studies of vision. Conscious realism states that the objective world consists of conscious agents and their experiences; these can be mathematically modeled and empirically explored in the normal scientific manner. I present a mathematical model and discuss its implications. Together these two theses provide a new formulation and solution to the mind-body problem. They also entail epiphysicalism: consciousness creates physical objects and properties, but physical objects and properties have no causal powers. For the conscious realist, the mind-body problem is how, precisely, conscious agents create physical objects and properties. Here, I argue, we have a vast and mathematically precise scientific literature, with successful implementations in computer vision systems. To a physicalist, the conscious-realist mind-body problem might appear to be a bait and switch that dodges hard and interesting questions: What is consciousness for? When and how did it arise in evolution? How does it now arise from brain activity? Now, admittedly, with conscious realism there is a switch, from the ontology of physicalism to the ontology of conscious realism. This switch changes the relevant questions. Consciousness is fundamental. So to ask what consciousness is for is to ask why something exists rather than nothing. To ask how consciousness arose in a physicalist evolution is mistaken. Instead we ask how the dynamics of conscious agents, when projected onto appropriate MUIs, yields current evolutionary theory as a special case. To ask how consciousness arises from brain activity is also mistaken. Brains are complex icons representing heterarchies of interacting conscious agents. So instead we ask how neurobiology serves as a user interface to such heterarchies. Conscious realism, it is true, dodges some tough mysteries posed by physicalism, but it replaces them with new, and equally engaging, scientific problems.   C15

34  The hard problem: A twofold solution  Jorge Morales <jorge_mlg@yahoo.com> (Philosophy, Universidad Panamericana, México DF, DF, México)
    Most recent explanations of consciousness are, at least, incomplete. Usually (but not always) these explanations are coherent with the rest of our current scientific paradigm: they demystify the mind-body problem, and remove its halo of insolubility. However, they tend to dismiss philosophy, giving up command to neurosciences. I will argue that science and philosophy do not oppose each other in the study of consciousness; on the contrary, both are necessary to solve different aspects of the problem. The fact that philosophy seems to be out of fashion in its attempts to solve the mind-body problem is due to the belief of many scientists (and philosophers) that the so-called hard problem does not exist at all. The usual answer to the question ‘Why the brain works the way it does?’ is both bizarre and trivial: that is the way nature works; it simply does it. Those who deny the hard problem do not realize that the why in the question may not be answered by scientific theories, but by philosophical accounts. The assumption that there is a causal link between brain and mind really yields two kinds of questions: How it does it? and Why it does it? The how question is of a scientific-technical kind and its answer may indeed be expressed in terms of molecules, neuron firings, brain zones, neurotransmitters, or something like that. The why question, however, cannot be understood in material terms, but in terms of sense and meaning. Thus, there is a sense of asking why, whereby do not expect a material-functional answer, but a global explanation: an explanation of the meaning, not of the process. Hence, the mind-body problem question is twofold: one part belongs to neurosciences (the objective-material part of human beings), and the other part, the anthropological one, belongs to philosophy (the subjective-conscious part of human beings). This way, it makes sense to say that there is no hard problem for science (it shouldn't be, in some way...), while there is indeed some problem for philosophy, and its solution is still pending.  P7

35  Joseph Levine’s problem of duality  Chris Schriner <uuchris2@aol.com> (Unitarian Universalist Assn., Fremont, CA)
    In his book, Purple Haze (2001), Joseph Levine explores a puzzle about consciousness which he calls the problem of duality. This problem involves the relationship between the use of the word, ‘experience,’ as a verb and as a noun. In both casual and philosophical communication, people use this word in referring to the act of experiencing, to that which is experienced, or to a compound event that includes both act and object. Thus the experience of tasting a strawberry involves (1) enjoying the flavor, (2) the flavor which is enjoyed, and perhaps also (3) a mysterious combination of the two. Is this just a verbal ambiguity, in which a single word refers to more than one state of affairs, or is something more perplexing involved? Levine suggests that we ought to be perplexed, because in considering our own experiences, it seems as if ‘the very same state is both cognitive apprehension and object of cognitive apprehension.’ (P. 176) He finds it ‘deeply puzzling ... that ... qualia, seem to have a dual character as both act and object.’ (P. 9) His conclusion is that qualia are in some sense ‘self-intimating.’ (P. 109) Since it would be difficult to comprehend self-intimating phenomena in physical terms, this leaves us with an explanatory gap between subjective experiences and any scientific attempt to describe such experiences. One aspect of the problem of duality seems especially troublesome for physicalists: If the act and the object of experience are both brain events, where are qualia ‘located?’ Are they neural events which realize qualia as objects of awareness, or neural events which realize the act of experiencing qualia? Either interpretation leads to peculiar conclusions. This paper will address these concerns by suggesting that our descriptions of experiences may be radically mistaken. Many philosophers would agree that we can make important errors about our own experiences. I will argue that erroneous assessments of introspectable phenomena lead us to believe there is a problem of duality.  P7

35a Consciousness and the relativity of science  Richard Loosemore <rpwl@lightlink.com>

      The hard problem of consciousness can be resolved as follows. (1) The final arbiter of what the mind deems “real” is that a thing is real if the concept that represents the thing plays nicely with the brain’s concept-building mechanisms. More specifically, concepts are real to the extent that they are consistent with other concepts, and with the larger space of collective concepts shared by society—“reality” is an emergent property of the particular design of (societies of) human cognitive systems. (2) There is one mechanism in the mind, deployed by scientists and naive thinkers alike, that can analyze concepts into their explanatory constituents: call this the “analysis mechanism.” When a naive thinker is asked “what is a chair?”, her brain automatically uses the analysis mechanism to break apart the Chair concept into whatever simpler constituents it can find. Science systematizes and objectifies this mechanism as Scientific Reduction. (3) This analysis mechanism works for the vast majority of concepts, but there is a particular class for which it conspicuously fails: when we ask “what is the essential difference between redness and greenness?” the analysis mechanism probes into the furthest neural links coming from sensory input devices, but returns with no answer because the red and green signals simply come along different channels. The same argument can be applied, mutatis mutandi, to other situations where the analysis mechanism dead-ends into either a primary sensory input (qualia) or a recursive concept (the self). (4) We suggest that the analysis mechanism does, in fact, get as far as to return a concept representing “the essence of red,” but this is barren, so the thinker declares that there is a “real” thing called redness, but that this is inexplicable. (5) This argument does not dismiss consciousness as an artifact or epiphenomenon. The concept of “real” is a constructed part of the system of concepts, like all other concepts, and is merely a summary of how well a given concept plays the consistency game that minds like to play. The concept proton is real; a concept like phlogiston is not, but both of these can be analyzed, so they both agree to play the consistency game (where they differ is in how phlogiston plays the game: it does not fit, so it is not real). The subjective aspects of consciousness refuse to play the game because they cannot be analyzed: they are neither real nor unreal, but inexplicable. This may seem like a denial of the reality of consciousness, but it is not: the question of its reality is strictly beyond the bounds of science. There is effectively a dead zone at the center of science, which science can predict and delineate, but which it cannot enter. (6) Postulating a neural (or other) locus for consciousness is thus meaningless: those who try will never be able to say clearly what the explanandum is. (7) This argument may lead to verifiable predictions about the behavior of qualia. P7

[01.08]  Higher-order thought

36  Monitoring theories of consciousness and introspective richness  Michael Bruno <mbruno@u.arizona.edu> (Philosophy, Tucson, AZ)
    Monitoring theories of conscious have been developed in both higher-order and same-order varieties. Higher-order theories hold that a mental state is conscious when it is the target of a separate and distinct mental state. Same-order theories hold that a mental state is conscious in virtue of that state having dual contents, one world-directed and one self-directed. Given how we understand the nature of mental states and contents, however, there seems to be a prima facie worry that there is no substantial difference between these views. One difference seems to emerge when we consider how they each attempt to explain introspection. According to higher-order theories, introspection occurs when there is an unconscious higher-order representation directed at another higher-order representation. According to same-order theories, introspection involves an attentional shift in which a subject becomes more focally aware of the self-directed content she is usually only peripherally aware of. I will raise a problem for each of these treatments of introspection. Same-order theories have a problem accounting for the possibility of cases in which one is able to introspect and introspective state. Higher-order theories face a problem accounting for the richness of introspection. After raising these problems, I will discuss possible responses on behalf of the proponents of each theory. Finally, I'll argue that embracing either one of these responses threatens to render the dispute between these views terminological.  P1

37  Four theses on peripheral awareness  Rocco Gennaro <rocco@indstate.edu> (Philosophy, Indiana State University, Terre Haute, IN)
    It is frequently said that some kind of "peripheral" (or inattentional) conscious awareness accompanies our "focal" (or attentional) conscious awareness. I agree that this is often the case as a matter of phenomenology, but clarity is needed on several fronts. In this paper I first present four distinguishable theses, each of which includes some notion of peripheral awareness and crucially depends upon whether or not such awareness is outer or inner directed. For example, most uncontroversially, we might all agree that we (at least sometimes) have outer-directed focal consciousness accompanied by outer-directed peripheral conscious awareness. It is less obvious (though still true I think), however, that we can sometimes have inner-directed focal consciousness accompanied by outer-directed peripheral conscious awareness. I ultimately lay out four theses on peripheral awareness and argue that we have good reasons to think that three of them are true. However, I argue that the fourth thesis, commonly associated with so-called "self-representational approaches to consciousness," is false. This claim is that we have outer focal consciousness accompanied often (or even always) by inner peripheral conscious (self-)awareness. This thesis has enjoyed significant support from the phenomenological tradition and from several contemporary writers. I criticize several arguments for this fourth thesis and thereby also self-representational theories of consciousness. My criticisms stem from both methodological and phenomenological considerations. In doing so, I offer a diagnosis as to why the fourth thesis has seemed true to so many and also show how the so-called "transparency of experience," frequently invoked by representationalists, is importantly relevant to my diagnosis. In short, there are important differences between this fourth thesis and the others considered. What emerges is that if one wishes to hold that some form of self-awareness accompanies all outer-directed conscious states, one is better off holding that such self-awareness is itself unconscious, as is held for example by standard higher-order theories of consciousness (or something very close to them).  C2

38  The self-representational theory of consciousness  Uriah Kriegel <kriegel@email.arizona.edu> (Tucson, )
    According to the Self-Representational Theory of Consciousness, a mental state or event is conscious when, and only when, it represents itself. For example, my current visual experience of the laptop in front of me represents both the laptop and itself. It is in virtue of representing the laptop that my experience is the conscious experience it is, but it is in virtue of representing itself that it is a conscious experience at all. In this talk, I sketch out a philosophical case for the self-representational theory. The case is “philosophical,” rather than scientific, in that it is based on considerations pertaining to the nature of what needs to be explained in a theory of consciousness, rather than to the question of how to do the explaining. I will argue that the case can be made by citing three highly plausible considerations, each of which rules out another set of competing theories, resulting in a narrowing down of the field of live options to the self-representational theory.   PL7

39  "Consciousness and intrinsic higher-order content"  David Rosenthal, David M. Rosenthal <davidrosenthal@nyu.edu> (Philosophy/Cognitive Science, CUNY Graduate Center, New York, NY)
    Mental states occur both consciously and not consciously. But no state is conscious when the subject is in no way conscious of that state; so a state's being conscious consists at least in part in a subject's being in some way conscious of that state. A major task of any theory of consciousness is therefore to specify just how subjects must be conscious of their mental states for those states to be conscious. The various higher-order theories that have proliferated in recent years differ in how they answer that question. One issue that has divided theorists is how conscious states are related to one's consciousness of them. Some theorists, myself among them, have argued that one's consciousness of each conscious state is due to a distinct higher-order state that represents one as being in the target state. Others have urged that such consciousness is, instead, intrinsic to the state one is conscious of. These intrinsicalist theories follow Franz Brentano's (1874) Aristotelian view, on which each conscious state represents itself. Intrinsicalists urge that their view squares best with our introspective sense that consciousness is an intrinsic property of mental states. Because we are seldom aware of any distinct higher-order state, our awareness of our conscious states seems, from a first-person point of view, to be intrinsic to those states. Intrinsicalists also urge that their view avoids various objections to theories that posit distinct higher-order states, such as my higher-order-thought hypothesis. And they urge that intrinsicalism has various explanatory advantages. I'll argue that none of those considerations succeeds in sustaining the intrinsicalist view. Some of the advantages claimed for intrinsicalism simply beg the question against distinct higher-order states; others fail for other reasons. I'll also argue that intrinsicalism faces serious difficulties of its own, and that there are independent theoretical advantages to positing distinct higher-order states.   PL7

40  Kant on phenomenal consciousness and self-consciousness  Tobias Schlicht <tobias.schlicht@uni-koeln.de> (Philosophy Department, University of Cologne, Köln, Germany)
    Higher-Order theories and self-representational theories of consciousness can both be seen as attempts of answering the question what makes a mental state conscious in mentalistic terms. According to the higher-order approach, in order to be conscious, a mental state has to be the object of some kind of higher-order representation or be part of a global state. According to the self-representational theory, mental states need to have the ability to represent themselves. Although such contemporary theories are highly original, their underlying idea goes at least back to Kant who already introduced a very detailed analysis of the structural connection between the mental state and the accompanying representation “I think”. In the paper, Kant’s very powerful approach is outlined and compared to contemporary positions and the challenges they meet. Kant’s famous phrase that it has to be possible for the “I think” to accompany all my representations firstly explains what it means that a mental state is something for me, the subject of experience. Thereby, it highlights a link between phenomenal consciousness and self-consciousness which can be expressed using some Husserlian ideas and terminology. It also makes it possible to distinguish phenomenal consciousness from richer, conceptual forms of self-consciousness. In addition, it explains the unity of experience, i.e. that our experience always entails a manifold of representations yet being one coherent experience or global representation for one and the same subject. Finally, it provides a powerful account of the empirical fact that the subject of experience is conscious of its identity with respect to a manifold of changing mental states (representations). Kant’s account gives solutions to a number of puzzling phenomena in connection with phenomenal consciousness and the first-person-perspective. Therefore, it is still very fruitful to consider his ideas in developing a theory of phenomenal consciousness in our day.  C2

41  The structure of inner awareness vis-a-vis same-order monitoring  David Woodruff Smith <dwsmith@uci.edu> (Philosophy, University of California, Irvine, Irvine, California)
    In early modern philosophy, it was proposed that consciousness is characterized by a kind of self-representation or consciousness-of-consciousness (variously configured by Locke, Leibniz, Kant). In the early decades of phenomenology, it was proposed that this type of self-consciousness could not be a separate, higher-order consciousness of a conscious experience, on pain of infinite regress. This was the view of Brentano, Husserl, and Sartre, though their explications differed in important detail. In recent philosophy of mind, in the analytic tradition, it has been proposed that what makes a mental state conscious is a higher-order mental state that monitors the first or base state. This higher-order state may be a kind of inner perception of the base state, or a kind of thought about the base state, or its own type of monitoring of the base state, say, achieved by a unique form of brain activity. (Armstrong, Rosenthal, Lycan, and others.) Other philosophers, however, have objected to various features of these higher-order monitoring models of what makes a mental state conscious. (Myself, Siewert, Dretske, Thomasson, Kriegel, and others.) In this paper I shall explore in rather close detail two models of this same-order monitoring that is claimed to make a mental state conscious: my own evolving model, and Uriah Kriegel’s recent model. As Kriegel has argued, an advantage of his model over higher-order models is that the monitoring is an integral (essential, internal) part of the monitored base state. Sometimes he calls this a “logical” part of the mental state. I think this view is on the right track, and I shall try to explicate the sense in which this part is a logical part: namely, it is a dependent part of the given conscious experience, and its ideal content is a dependent part of the ideal content, or phenomenological structure, of the base experience. That said, I shall recur to my own model of the phenomenological structure of a typical conscious mental state or experience. There are, however, not one, but two places in the structure in which monitoring occurs. One place is in the periphery of attention; the other is in what I call the modal character of the experience. (I draw on two bodies of work to distinguish these forms of monitoring.) Thus, I distinguish two forms of inner awareness of an experience, both characteristic of normal states of consciousness. That said, I shall look to the relative merits of these two models of intrinsic, same-order monitoring. I shall recur to a characterization of “self-consciousness” that I think is effective yet elliptical, that by Jean-Paul Sartre. I shall then try to see how the two models of monitoring square with something like that phenomenological description of inner awarenss.   C2

42  Rethinking the self-reflexive nature of consciousness  Robert Van Gulick <RNVANGUL@syr.edu> (Philosophy, Syracuse University, Syracuse , NY)
    Most reflexive theories of consciousness explicate consciousness in terms of self-awareness. They typically appeal to higher-order mental states that are distinct from their mental objects and that explicitly represent those states as states of the same self that is the subject of those higher-order states. Such theories have several assets, but they are also open to a number of powerful objections. In particular they have been criticized for not adequately explicating the phenomenal and qualitative aspects of consciousness. Alternative reflexive models might be offered that retained the link between consciousness and self-awareness but that did not locate the relevant form of self-awareness in distinct explicit higher-order states. They might instead explicate it in terms of an implicit reflexive aspect that is present in the very structure of phenomenal states themselves. Such states are not conscious in virtue of some separate higher-order state that is directed at them, but rather in virtue the self-reflexive aspects embedded in their structure, organization and content. It is those aspects that enable conscious states to occur as states of a conscious self. Developing such alternative reflexive models involves carefully analyzing the sorts of distinctive intentional contents associated with phenomenal mental states, and then showing that such contents involve essential reflexive elements in a variety of ways. These alternative models treat the self as an emergent feature of phenomenal organization rather than as a separate element that in some way monitors or introspects conscious states. Such models may be able to avoid the sorts of criticisms aimed at more standard reflexive theories. Moreover they are also consistent with much of what is known about the neural substrate of conscious states.   PL7

43  The self-representational theory and the misrepresentation of consciousness  Josh Weisberg <jwsleep@aol.com> (Philosophy and Cognitive Science, CUNY Graduate Center, New York, NY)
    The self-representational theory (SRT) of mental state consciousness holds that conscious states are a special kind of self-representing state--a state that both makes the subject aware of the world and makes the subject aware of being in that very state. SRT theorists generally hold that this self-representational process can be explained naturalistically; thus, the SRT offers the possibility of a naturalistic explanation of mental state consciousness. However, naturally occurring representational process can go awry. It's possible that the complex mental state accounting for conscious experience might misrepresent some of its own properties. Further, the state might make us aware of a representation of the world that doesn't in fact exist. A number of objectors have previously argued that this possibility is damning for the "higher-order" (HO) theory of consciousness. In this talk, I extend the criticism to the SRT. However, I argue that the objection only has bite if we fail to characterize the explanatory data in the way demanded by the SRT. The views hold that a conscious state is a state that the subject is conscious of herself as being in. This suggests a second and more fundamental kind of self-representation at work in the SRT: conscious states are states we represent ourselves as being in. I argue that once this is taken into account, the objection fails. Further, it narrows the distance between the SRT and the HO theory. Both views, I argue, explain the same data with largely the same theoretical tools. I close by considering several further ways the views might come apart. I conclude the distance between them may be more apparent than real.   C2

[01.09]  Epistemology and philosophy of science

44  Integral methodological pluralism: Multiple perspectives in the study of consciousness  Allan Combs, Esbjörn-Hargens, S. Integral Institute <acombs@saybrook.edu> (Consciousness & Spirituality, Saybrook Graduate School, Galena, OH)
    The all-quadrants, all-levels (AQAL) epistemological model, originally suggested by Wilber in 1995, posits four aspects of consciousness that also can be understood in four approaches or orientations. Consciousness is represented differently by each orientation, and each contains a unique set of methodologies for its study. These orientations are represented graphically by a square containing four quadrants: the two left-hand quadrants signify subjective orientations as well as subjective aspects of consciousness while the two right-hand quadrants signify objective orientations as well as objective aspects of consciousness. Similarly, the two upper quadrants signify singular orientations as well as singular aspects of consciousness while the two lower quadrants represent plural aspects of consciousness and plural orientations. In Wilber’s recent work (in preparation) of these four orientations can each be approached from the “inside” or the “outside,” yielding a total of eight epistemological perspectives. Taking them one at a time, the upper left quadrant seen from the inside signifies the 1st-person perspective and individual subjectivity. This perspective gives rise to 1st-person methodologies such as James’ naturalistic introspection, Husserl’s phenomenology, Buddhist “insight meditation,” and so on. The content of this quadrant seen form the outside perspective, however, yields 3rd-person methodologies such as object relations theory (e.g., Loevinger) and Piaget’s developmental psychology. The content of the lower left quadrant experienced from the inside yields methodologies such as hermeneutics, collaborative inquiry, and participatory epistemology, as well as philosophical explorations such as Martin Buber’s I and Thou. Seen from the outside, however, its content yields methodologies such as cultural anthropology, neostructuralism, and archaeology. The inside perspective of the upper right hand quadrant yields methodologies such as cognitive psychology and autopoietic modeling (e.g., Maturana and Varela), while the outside perspective yields methodologies such as empiricism and behaviorism. The inside perspective of the lower right hand quadrant provides methodologies that include social autopoiesis, as seen in the theories of Luhmann and Habermas, while the outside perspective yields functionalism and systems theory. Dividing these eight perspectives into interior and exterior viewpoints toward interior and exterior content generates four distinct approaches to the study of consciousness which Wilber terms Zones. Zone one represents 1st-person or interior approaches to both singular and plural interior content (“I” and “we”), while Zone two represents objective or “outside” approaches to both. The first instance is illustrated by “the look of a feel;” the second by the “look” of a shared experience. In analogous fashion, Zone three represents exterior content (“it” or “its”) understood from within its own boundaries, a 1st-person approach to 3rd-person content, while Zone four represents 3rd-person, objective, content seen from an objective 3rd-person perspective.   P7

45  Why the natural world does not work without qualia and consciousness of them  Stephen Deiss <deiss@appliedneuro.com> (Applied Neurodynamics, Encinitas, CA)
    Modern scientific methodology is based upon a metaphor that sees nature governed by natural laws. The search for them is what scientific research is all about. These laws have a precarious existence. Some would place them in the mind of God. Some would place the natural laws in a kind of netherland like Plato’s world of forms. Denial of both these options is the starting point for a new approach to philosophy of science and mind long overdue. When one considers how nature behaves when there are no gods in charge and no oracle to consult, one finds that nature is in fact quite natural and familiar. Qualia are found necessary for the normal operation of the universe. Conscious awareness, properly conceived, is found to be ubiquitous at all levels of natural organization. WHIL questions, “what is it like - ” become very tempting in thinking about nature. The result is that the panpsychism approach, an alternate metaphor for a really ultra-modern natural science, is the best metaphor to use going forward into a new eco-friendly century. While it is often assumed that panpsychism requires seeing nature with human colored glasses, it will be shown that this view is the only one on the table that is consistent with a truly natural universe without any transcendental nor supernatural factors and without projecting our humanity into it. There will always remain mysteries that are left to personal interpretive preference. However, the basic scientific way of observing nature and testing hypotheses will be recast into a new light that is more bullet proof because it will be based upon a view that is self explanatory and consistent with the way that nature works at all levels in a self-similar way. This overhaul of philosophy of science begins with a look at modern system theory and how dynamics is used to describe all manner of systems. There is a core set of ideas defining states, inputs, outputs, and state transition functions that is universal in science and technology. This metaphor has been around since the middle of the last century. There have been previous attempts to capture all of nature in a systems view under the names of General System Theory, Cybernetics and others related. They never quite finished the job because consciousness and qualia were always left out of the equations. That left us with some hard problems built into these new theories the same way it was built into the foundations of positivistic empiricism. However, it will be shown that once the transcendental realm is thrashed out of the systems view of nature, we are left with something very rigorous and yet very congenial with our own personal experience. If this thesis passes the test of public debate, it will in one leap of intuition and metaphorical recalibration solve the hard problem, solve the problem of qualia, eliminate dualism, set aside eliminative materialism, put meaning into nature, and thereby make it a more humane place to live and more worth preserving.   P1

46  Consciousness and the pseudonoumenal  Charles Fox <charles@robots.ox.ac.uk> (Engineering Dept, Oxford University, Oxford, UK, UK)
    Building on Kant, we define the 'pseudonoumenal' world to be a society's best current phenomenal model of the unknowable noumenal world. For example it has at various times consisted of: the 'four elements'; atoms and Newtonian forces; and various formulations of quantum wave functions. We argue that as all phenomena presuppose the existence of consciousness for them to exist in, then consciousness must be noumenal, not phenomenal. (To identify consciousness with a phenomenon would be to presuppose its own existence - a circular definition.) Consciousness is thus the only noumenon that is knowable. Noumena are generally unknowable but following Popper and Peirce we should (normatively) believe that our most useful pseudonoumenal model is 'true'. Pragmatically, consciousness should therefore be identified with an element of our pseudonoumenal model. Parsimony suggests that an identity with an already-postulated psuedonoumenon (property dualism) is more likely than an identity with a newly-postulated (substance dualist) noumenon /em{iff} we can empirically observe a correlation between the presence of first-person experience (for example, in anesthetic experiments) and the presence of the third-person pseudonoumenon. We will demonstrate how several popular identity positions including Functionalism, macroscopic Materialism and Panpsychism may be seen as types of Emergentist theories - which in turn reduce to Substance Dualisms - from the pseudonoumenal viewpoint when combined with most contemporary pseudonoumenologies ('it-from-bit' pseudonoumenology being a notable exception). Whilst this does not rule out these theories, it renders them less parsimonious than a well-correlated property dualist theory. Briefly, the argument is that functions, macroscopic objects and 'groups' of objects only exist phenomenally, not pseudonoumenally, and so Functionalists, macroscopic Materialists and Panpsychists respectively must all postulate new 'emergent' (substance dualist) pseudonoumena to make their identifications. We present a neo-Cartesian argument for pseudonoumenalism: Consciousness exists noumenally. I know this because /em{I} exist; I am not a fiction. Non-pseudonoumenal objects such as chairs, programs, functions and brains exist only phenomenally; they are useful predictive fictions. And one cannot make an identity between something that exists noumenally and something that is merely a fiction. /em{I} am not merely a fiction! Therefore consciousness is identical to a noumenon, and should only be identified with a pseudonoumenon in our theories. Finally we examine the 'hard problem' from the pseudonoumenalist viewpoint. We will argue that identifying consciousness with a pseudonoumenon - especially an already-postulated pseudonoumenon such as Orch-OR - is no more problematic than identities in other sciences, which ultimately bottom out into sets of observed empirical correlations. So we can never be completely certain of a pseudonoumenal identity theory, but this is no worse than other sciences, whose theories are also subject to change. The